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Herm Hughes submits the following brief in reply to Quintekfs 
appellee brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I. To be entitled to raise issues on appeal, it is 
sufficient that the issues were raised in a manner sufficient to 
obtain a ruling thereon. Herm Hughes presented sufficient facts 
and arguments at the trial to raise the issues regarding Utah Code 
Ann. § 7 0A-2-2 07 and waiver. At the trial, the trial court 
announced that the provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
would govern the case. In its objections to Quintekfs proposed 
findings and conclusions, and at the hearing held December 5, 1990, 
Herm Hughes argued the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 and 
the issue of waiver clearly and specifically. The trial court 
entered conclusions of law on these issues. 
Point II. Quintek's three theories, Uniform Commercial Code, 
statute of frauds, and bid shopping, do not sustain the trial 
court's judgment. Quintek misapplies Section 2-207 of the Utah 
U.C.C. The statute of frauds is satisfied by the writings and 
conduct of the parties. Any alleged bid shopping did not preclude 
a contract. 
Point III. Public policy favors enforcing contracts between 
general contractors and their suppliers for the sale of goods under 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207. U.C.C. Section 2-207 has sufficient 
safeguards to protect against being bound to unwanted terms. In 
this case, Quintek did not raise price as an issue in its 
objections to Herm Hughes's supplier agreement and presented no 
1 
evidence that it was prejudiced by herm Hughes's acceptance. 
Point IV. Quintek!s request for a contract is inconsistent 
with the position Quintek takes now, that the ten-day acceptance 
period expired. Any negotiation Quintek pursued was on the 
additional terms in the supplier agreement only—not on the terms 
of its proposal, which form the basis of the contract. 
Point V. Quintek1s Rule 33 argument is without merit because 
this appeal has a reasonable basis in both fact and law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court had squarely before it the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 7 0A-2-2 07 and 
the issue of waiver; these issues are properly 
before this court. 
The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated the following standard 
for determining when an issue has been sufficiently raised in the 
trial court to enable the appeals court to consider it: 
For a question to be considered on appeal, the 
record must clearing show that it was timely 
presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon . . . .* 
This Court has further refined the standard by stating that if a 
matter is sufficiently raised at the trial court level, it may be 
raised on appeal if the matter has been submitted to the trial 
court and the trial court has had an opportunity to make findings 
of fact or conclusions of law.2 The record shows that Herm Hughes 
raised these issues at the trial court level timely and in a manner 
1
 Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 
1040, 1045 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). 
2
 James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987). 
2 
that enabled the trial court to rule on them. 
A. Herm Hughes raised the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. S 70A-2-207 in the trial court. 
The argument that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-2 07 governs the 
formation of the contract between Herm Hughes and Quintek in this 
case was not raised for the first time on appeal. As early as the 
pleadings, Herm Hughes alleged facts to which that section applies. 
At trial, counsel alluded to those facts and made reference to the 
elements of that section, and the trial court itself acknowledged 
that several sections of the Uniform Commercial Code applied to the 
case. By its objection to Quintekfs proposed findings and 
conclusions, by its own findings and conclusions, and by its 
arguments at the hearing held December 5, 1990, Herm Hughes 
specifically argued that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 applies to this 
case. 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges in paragraph 8: 
Plaintiff sent a Supplier Agreement to 
defendant which conformed to defendant's 
written cost estimate (bid), but 
defendant failed and refused to execute 
said agreement and has failed and refused 
to perform pursuant to its telephone bid 
and written cost estimate.3 
Consistent with its pleading, at trial Herm Hughes presented 
evidence of an offer and acceptance for a contract for the supply 
of roof trusses, particularly Quintekfs "Cost Estimate" or bid 
(Exhibit 6) and Herm Hughes's Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11). 
Herm Hughes also put on evidence of conduct that recognizes the 
3
 Record, page 18 (hereinafter abbreviated as, e.g., R. 18). 
3 
existence of a contract. 
At the trial, following the presentation of plaintiff's 
evidence, Quintek moved for dismissal of plaintiff's case. In 
response to the motion, Herm Hughes frankly acknowledged that there 
was no agreement signed by both parties.4 But Herm Hughes argued 
that the parties had reached an agreement on the terms of Exhibits 
6 and 11 that were the same, and that there were no "material" new 
terms in Exhibit ll.5 
In closing arguments, Herm Hughes argued that the differences 
between Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 11 were de minimis6 and that the 
supplier agreement did not "materially" differ from the bid 
submitted by Quintek.7 These are the very concepts and terms used 
in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207. Indeed, the import of these 
arguments was not lost upon the trial court: 
MR. WEEKS: And we believe, your Honor, 
that contrary to Counsel's argument that the— 
the differences in the Exhibit No. 11 are de 
minimus [sic] as to the items that have been 
added to the performance. 
Exhibit 6 says— 
THE COURT: They may very well be, Mr. 
Weeks. I hate to keep interrupting you here, 
but I think that the UCC is going to come into 
play much more than either of you have 
indicated to the Court before this is through. 
MR. WEEKS: Well, but even the Code, your 
Honor, requires that the—the counter-offers 
b e — 
4
 Transcript of trial, page 106, lines 17-22 (hereinafter 
abbreviated as, e.g., T. 106 11. 17-22). 
5T. Ill 11. 6-11. See Addendum B. 
6T. 177 1. 16; T. 181 1. 1. See Addendum B. 
7T. 181 11. 14-17. See Addendum B. 
4 
THE COURT: Yeah, but it handles a lot of 
the other problems that have arisen in this 
particular case. And that's what I'm—all I'm 
saying is that there are a lot of problems 
that the Code treats directly by one or other 
— o r another section in sales relating to 
matters of this nature that I think we're 
going to have to give some consideration to, 
that's both with respect to what Mr. Lambert 
is claiming and with respect to what you're 
claiming. 
In fact, I glanced at it during our 
recess and it is replete with sections that 
bear directly on the problem that you're 
presenting to me, and I'm not asking vou to 
refer to them and expound on them at this 
time. I just want you to know that I know 
that there's a lot of law there that I'm going 
to have to take a hard look at and try and see 
if it will help me resolve the factual issues, 
some of which may be important and some may 
not.8 
After the txi a] Herm Hi igl les objec ted tc • Qu i r 1 tek ' s proposed 
findings and conclusions and proposed its own findings and 
conclusions.9 Herm Hughes's proposed finding -. - suggested mat 
the Court f i i id tl lat Qu i i itek and! Herm Hughes, t h> * r * •:: x . * 1 
by their wri tings, had made a contract for the sale v.-: r JO: trusses 
on the essential terms of Quintek's bi d proposal.10 Herm Hughes 
objected t< :.r - H K ' I U S J U M no I (t.h.it ilnun was no meeti ncij of 
the minds) - :.rx grounds that there was a meeting of the minds on 
the essential terms of an agreement for the supply of roof trusses, 
whi cl: i essenti al ter ins w^n? \ husi-» s< *l i oii h i n Qui ntek '" s bid 
8T. 177 1. 14 through T. 178 J , 1 6 (emphasis added) ; see also 
T. 193 1. 22 through T. 194 1. 1. 
9
 R> 153-157; 188-203. See Addenda C ana u. 
10
 T? 1QA 
proposal.11 Herm Hughes's proposed conclusions of law specifically 
recited the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207, and referred to 
that section by section number.12 
On December 5, 1990, the trial court held a hearing on Herm 
Hughes's objections to Quintek's proposed findings and conclusions. 
At the hearing, Herm Hughes argued that this case is a contract 
formation case governed by Sections 2-204 and 2-207 of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code, citing those sections specifically.13 
The following excerpt from the transcript of that hearing 
shows that the trial court clearly understood Herm Hughes's 
position and rejected it: 
MR. FETZER: I think the Code says that 
if you've got a counter-proposal that under— 
under non-U.C.C. contract law would normally 
kill the offer, but that proposal essentially 
meets the terms of the—excuse me, the 
counter-offer essentially meets the terms of 
the proposal, you've got a contract on . . . 
those points where it meets, and you don't 
have it on the other ones if they're material, 
but as between merchants, you do if there—the 
additional terms are to be construed as 
proposals for addition to the contract--this 
is on the counter-proposal. Between 
merchants, such terms become part of the 
contract unless, and then it lists some— 
unless the offer expressly limits acceptance 
to the terms of the offer or they materially 
alter it, or notification or objection to them 
has already been given, or is given within a 
reasonable time after notice of that is 
received. 
11
 R. 193, 5 1. 
12
 See proposed conclusions nos. 1 - 9 and 13, R. 189-191. 
13
 Transcript of hearing held December 5, 1990, page 9 line 24 
through page 11 line 16 (hereinafter referred to as, e.g., Hg.T. 9 
1. 24 through 11 1. 16). See Addendum E. 
6 
And I think Boyd Jacobson gave those 
timely, that no, we're not going to agree to 
A, B, C, and D, but I don't think A, B, C, and 
D included the essential terms of the 
agreement. , , , That's—that's my view of the 
case and i f I'm up in the night, I want to 
know. 
THE COURT: Well, my problem is, I have 
some difficulty with maybe even the Code in a 
circumstance such as that. I don't think that 
a bidder ought to be put in the position of 
having in every case to establish a contract 
with the person to whom he submitted that bid 
if that person hasn't dc>ile something to 
confirm it, and I don't think these Herm 
Hughes people did. They were . . . too busy . 
. to pay attention to that thing. That's 
the impression I got. . . . 
MR. FETZER: What about that supplier 
agreement, your Honor? Is—didn't that:--
THE COURT: That was a Johnny-come-lately 
thing that gives me some problems, but I don't 
think that it's the type of thing that Is 
going to make a contract in this case. You 
may convince the Appellate Court to the 
contrary, but I gave you my impressions, and 
after I sat through this thing, I couldn't, in 
good conscience, find sufficient evidence, as 
far as I was concerned, to find in favor of 
your party.14 
The trial court's conclusion of law number 6 reflects the thinking 
o f t: 1 1 e t r i a 1 c <:> n i :i : t e x p r e s s e c:i i :i I 11: i e f o r e g o i n g e x c e r p t.15 
Herm Hughes does not dispute that the main theory of its case 
at trial was that the conduct of Herm Hughes and Quintek showed 
* - ' - -* • • • • .: theory i s recogni zed by 
bot*. ;ar , DUO y. : -* »•;-.- . • , i •; i a- i , 7 0A-2-2 07 ( 3 ) . That Herm. 
Hughes did not point out those specific provisions to the trial 
14
 Hg.T. 68 1, ] 3 through " 1 " Sea also Hg.T 
through 3 8 1. ! ; 64 ] 2 3 thro-:if *' - . ^ : tr:r; 
8; 70 1. 12. 
15
 R. .- See Addendum F. 
7 
court does not matter. Neither was it inconsistent for Herm Hughes 
to admit that it could not pin down the day the contract existed 
and at the same time argue that there was a contract. Utah Code 
Ann. §70A-2-204(2) provides: "An agreement sufficient to constitute 
a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its 
making is undetermined." It is clear the trial court believed the 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code were applicable. 
Furthermore, the trial court excused the parties from presenting 
arguments regarding those provisions at trial. Herm Hughes did 
present arguments specifically directed to those two sections at 
the hearing on December 5, 1990. The relevant provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code were squarely before the trial court, the 
trial court had a clear opportunity to rule on those theories, and 
it did enter a conclusion of law related to them. 
B. Herm Hughes raised the issue of waiver 
before the trial court. 
The trial court also ruled on Herm Hughes's argument that 
Quintek waived the ten day acceptance limit in its proposal. The 
principal evidence supporting Herm Hughes's theory of waiver is the 
testimony of Quintek's president, Boyd Jacobson, a witness for 
Quintek. It was Mr. Jacobson who testified that in the middle of 
November 1983 he called Todd Walker, an employee of Herm Hughes and 
asked why Quintek had not received a contract. A few days later, 
he went to the office of Herm Hughes to ask for a contract and to 
pick up a set of plans. He testified that Mr. Walker had a set of 
8 
plans for Quintek and gave him a supplif ~^ agreement.16 
Herm Hughes's proposed findings JI< . •- ^ \\v\ its proposed 
conclusion no. 1018 specificaJly addressed the evidence of waiver. 
At the December 5, 1 990, hearing Herm Hughes argued the issue of 
wa iver.19 . c 1 eai: ' 11: Ie <,:o11 rt u nd e r s. t: o od ar id cons ider ed that 
argument: 
Now, you've talked about waiver and maybe the 
Appellate Court will look at this thing and 
say, well, by doing this and doing that, they 
waived the right to declare the contract—that 
there was no binding contract I don't know; 
but the thing that impressed me at the trial 
is that everything that Herm Hughes came up 
with, these other people seemed to have a 
reasonable and logical explanation for it 
apart from the fact that they were intending 
to go forward with the contract, They were 
accommodating, and that may be their 
downfall.20 
The trial court's conclusion no 7 specifically addresses 
waiver.21 Conclusion no. 7 was added after the hearing on December 
5, .1 99 0.22 
Herm Hughes p r e s e n t e d t h e i s s u e s ^f n t^h ^ o d e A:v\. K -, -. L-7 
and w a i v e r i n t h e t r i a ] c o u r t . The :* i\ Cv , i r t c o n s i d e r e d t h o s e 
i s s u e s ; , bi i t i: u l eci on t l l o s e i s s u e s aga , • ^ r l i ighes 
16
 T. 12 6 1 . 4 t h r o u g h 1 2 ; ] 2 0 . 
17
 R. 1 9 7 - 1 9 8 ; Addendum D. 
18
 R. 1 9 0 ; Addendum D. 
19
 H g . T 1.1 I . 1" '" t h r o u g h 12 I . 1 M ,• A d d s dum, E . 
20 H g . T , 6 2 , 13 1 2 - 2 1 . 
21
 R. 2 2 8 , 
22 Cf, R 15 3 - 1 5 4 , 
9 
has properly preserved the issues for appeal. 
II. The trial court's judgment is not 
sustainable under the theories advanced by 
Quintek. 
A. Herm Hughes challenges the trial court's 
conclusions of law, not findings of fact. 
Herm Hughes does not challenge the findings of fact of the 
trial court, except in one minor respect that Herm Hughes has 
already addressed in its appellant's brief.23 Herm Hughes is 
therefore not required to shoulder the burden of marshalling all of 
the evidence to challenge the findings of fact. Herm Hughes 
challenges the trial court's legal conclusions. 
B. The trial court's judgment cannot be 
sustained on any of the legal theories 
advanced by Quintek. 
Quintek argues that the trial court's judgment can be 
sustained on alternative legal grounds. Quintek advances three 
theories: Utah Code Ann. § 7 0A-2-204 (Quintek discusses § 2-207, 
as well) , Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (statute of frauds) , and 
alleged bid shopping. 
1. Quintek improperly applies Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 70A-2-204 and 2-207. 
The thrust of Quintek's argument regarding Section 2-2 04 of 
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code is that there is no contract 
because Herm Hughes did not accept Quintek's proposal within the 
ten-day period. This was the trial court's stated ground for its 
Ruling. Herm Hughes has addressed this issue in Appellant's Brief 
23
 See pages 16 and 17 of Appellant's Brief regarding the date 
on which Quintek received the supplier agreement. 
10 
at pages 17-2 0. Due to the restrictions of Ru3 e 24(c), which 
limits rep] y briefs '' to ai 1 swer i i 1 g ai i} i i.e ; i mat ters set forth :i i i the 
opposing brief," Herm. Hughes wi ] 1 not reiterate its arguments here. 
Also as part of i ts arguments under Section 2-2 04, Quintek 
maintains that Utah Code Ann. \ - . - is not applicable because 
Quintek di d not admit there wa ; ; contract. Herm Hughes asserts 
there :i s a en Dntract ar :i si ng um the exchange of Quintek f s bid 
proposal (Exhibit 6) a:i id Herm Hughes's supplier agreement (Exhibit 
11), and from the conduct of the parties. This is precisely the 
kin d o f c o n t r a c t f o r m a t i o n i s s I i e 11 I a t I J t z 11 i C o d e A n i i % 7 0 A - 2 - 2 0 7 (3 ) 
addresses. 
In its brief, Quintek leaps past the contract formation 
fun c t i o n o f s i i b s e c t i o i I 1 o f § 7 0 A - 2 - 2 0 7 a n d e r r o n e o i I s 1 } e in p h a s i z e s 
subsection whose purpose J:» : - ietermine whether additional 
terms ; n :-.r i^ceptance are pnri :•: *~hc contract. :!.>:t question is 
n- * ;- : - s Coiii: t ' "*' . ^ ( : c::"'- .. . L*- - : ~.elf 
states: 
In other words, a contract comes into being 
when the responsive form is sent, irrespective 
of variances in the printed terms. That is 
the first purpose of Section 2-207(1); namely, 
to decree that in an exchange of forms 
transaction, where the responsive document 
repeats the names of the parties, the price, 
the description of the goods, the quantity and 
the delivery date, it consummates a contract 
as an acceptance. It is a "definite and 
seasonable expression" of response that binds 
both parties.24 
R. Duesenberg & L. King, Bender's Uniform Commercial Code 
Service § 3 05, at 3-5 3 
] :i 
Cases cited by Quintek in support of the proposition that the 
parties must admit that there is a contract do not support that 
proposition. Marlene Industries Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45 
N.Y.2d 327, 380 N.E.2d 239 (1978), is not relevant because it was 
a case under subsection 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-2 07. 
The issue of contract formation was not before that court. Duval 
& Co. v Malcom. 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356 (1975), is not helpful 
to Quintek1s position. In that case, the buyer's response to the 
seller's proposal for a quantities contract differed so materially 
on the critical element of quantity that the court concluded there 
had been no meeting of the minds. It therefore held § 2-2 07 
inapplicable. In this case, by contrast, Herm Hughes's supplier 
agreement matched Quintek's bid on all essential elements. 
In U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Semco Manufacturing, Inc., 562 
F.2d 1061, 1067 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1977) the court found that the 
sequence of negotiation and the exchange of the buyer's form and 
seller's form clearly showed an agreement and an intent to enter 
into a contract. In this case Quintek submitted its bid proposal 
and then, less than one month later, went to the office of Herm 
Hughes to ask for a contract. Herm Hughes complied by delivering 
the supplier agreement. That conduct, together with the subsequent 
conduct of the parties, evinces a clear intent of the parties to 
form a contract. 
The Court in the U.S. Industries case also examined the terms 
of the offer and acceptance to determine if the acceptance diverged 
significantly with regard to a dickered term. Finding that it did 
12 
not, the Court concluded that a definite and seasonable expression 
of acceptance had been given• Likewise, in this case, Herm 
Hughes's supplier agreement left the essential terms of Quintek's 
bid intact. The only modification of those terms was the proposal 
to include a ten percent retention. But that was not a significant 
enough diversion to evince a lack of intent to contract. 
Quintek cannot escape the formation of a contract on the 
essential terms of its proposal by arguing that it did not agree to 
the additional or different terms. The Uniform Commercial Code 
does not allow an offeror to welsh on its agreement simply because 
the acceptance states terms that are additional to or different 
from the offer. The result is fair because the offeror has at 
least the grounds provided in subsection 2 of § 2-2 07 for alleging 
that the additional or different terms are not part of the 
contract. 
Herm Hughes respectfully suggests that the proper 
interpretation of § 2-207, therefore, is not to rely upon the 
parties1 subjective intent or even upon their express statements 
about whether a contract exists, because the effect of § 2-207(1) 
is to allow acceptances that fairly meet the terms of an offer to 
"operate as an acceptance," that is, to form a contract. The 
standard should therefore be the standard of the U.S. Industries 
case: the responding form operates as an acceptance unless it 
significantly changes a dickered term.25 
Accord, J. White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 
§1-3, pp. 47-48 (3d ed. 1988). 
13 
2. The statute of frauds is satisfied by the 
writings and conduct of the parties. 
The trial court disregarded the statute of frauds argument 
raised by Quintek at the trial court level, Quintek had originally 
proposed a conclusion of law as follows: 
Any agreement between the parties was 
required to be in writing pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201, unless 
excused by one of the exclusions stated 
therein.26 
At the hearing on December 5, 1990, regarding plaintiff's 
objections to the proposed findings and conclusions, the trial 
court stated that he was not influenced by the statute of frauds 
and that the finding was unnecessary.27 The findings and 
conclusions signed by the trial court do not contain a conclusion 
of law referring to the statutes of frauds although there is a 
conclusion (no. 5) referring to partial performance*.28 
The trial court's reasoning on the statute of frauds is 
correct. It is inapplicable to this case. Either the writings of 
the parties formed a contract pursuant to Utah Code* Ann. § 7 0A-2-
2 07, or the conduct of the parties formed such a contract under 
subsection 3 of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207(3) (in which case "the 
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which 
R. 154. I2[sic]. 
Hg.T. 78 1. 22 through 79 1. 19. See Addendum E. 
R. 229, 55. 
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the writings of the parties agree")29, or their conduct formed a 
contract pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204. In either 
eventuality, Quintek's bid proposal binds Quintek and Herm Hughes's 
supplier agreement binds Herm Hughes to the terms of each that 
overlap. These terms are sufficiently definite to take the 
contract out of the statute of frauds. 
None of the cases cited by Quintek applies to the facts of 
this case where there has been a written offer and a written 
acceptance as well as conduct recognizing the existence of a 
contract. None of the cases involved either Section 2-2 07 or 
Section 2-2 04 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Nevertheless, if this Court determines that the statute of 
frauds applies to the contract between Herm Hughes and Quintek, and 
further, that the contract has not satisfied the requirements of 
subsection 1 of the Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 regarding a writing, 
then Herm Hughes respectfully submits that Quintek's activities in 
preparation for manufacturing the roof trusses satisfy subsection 
3 of that section, particularly when considered in connection with 
the exchange of documents between the parties. Quintek's 
preparations to perform included opening and making entries in a 
job log, having shop drawings drafted and approved by an engineer, 
and discussing with Herm Hughes the specifications related to those 
shop drawings. Under the circumstances of this case, where 
Quintek's proposal and Herm Hughes's supplier agreement overlap on 
critical terms, and where Quintek prepared shop drawings that were 
29
 Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 (3) . 
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intended to comply with particular specifications for the Midland 
Elementary School Project, there was sufficient protection against 
the kind of dishonesty the statute of frauds is designed to avoid. 
3. Alleged bid shopping did not affect the 
formation of the contract between Herm Hughes 
and Ouintek. 
The trial court was not influenced by Quintek's evidence 
regarding the alleged bid shopping, other than to conclude that 
Quintek had reason to wonder what Herm Hughes's intentions were.30 
It was after Quintek had learned from Mr. Gilson of the Oscar E. 
Chytraus Company that Herm Hughes was supposedly shopping Quintek's 
bid that Mr. Jacobson went to Herm Hughes's office and asked for a 
contract. Obviously Quintek was not dissuaded from seeking a 
contract with Herm Hughes. By seeking the contract Quintek revived 
the proposal or waived any argument that Herm Hughes could not 
accept the proposal. 
III. Public policy favors enforcing contracts 
formed under Utah Code Ann. § 7 0A-2-2 07. 
Giving effect to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 in this case will 
uphold an important public policy in the construction industry: 
maintaining the integrity and the predictability of the contracting 
process between contractors and suppliers. One of the purposes of 
those who drafted § 2-2 07 of the Uniform Commercial Code was to 
30
 Hg. T. 28 1. 11 through 30 1. 19; 77 11. 20-25. See 
Addendum E. Herm Hughes disputes the characterization of its 
inquiry with Oscar E. Chytraus Company as bid shopping. 
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keep the welsher in the contract.31 In addition, enforcing § 2-
207(1) according to its terms will bring predictability to dealings 
between contractors and suppliers of good. In the context of 
commercial sales neither contractors nor suppliers should be 
surprised that they have consummated a contract when their written 
offers and written acceptance overlap on critical, bargained terms. 
Nor will either party be bound to additional or different terms 
unwittingly, because both will be armed with the tools provided by 
subsection 2 to escape such terms. 
Quintek complains that applying § 2-2 07 to the circumstances 
of this case would violate public policy because materials prices 
can change if a contractor is allowed to accept price terms after 
substantial time passes. But Quintek was not without the means to 
protect itself. Quintek could have expressly withdrawn its offer. 
Instead, Quintek approached Herm Hughes after approximately two or 
two and one-half weeks, requesting a contract. If price had been 
a concern to Quintek after the passage of that time, it could have 
made its request conditioned on a new price term. Quintek 
presented no evidence that it did so. When Herm Hughes responded 
to Quintek's request by handing Mr. Jacobson a supplier agreement, 
Mr. Jacobson made no objection to the price term in the supplier 
agreement. Instead, he objected to such matters as the flow-down 
clause, liquidated damages, indemnification, and the ten percent 
retention. Quintek presented no evidence at the trial that the 
31
 J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-2, p. 27 
(3d ed. 1988). 
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lumber prices actually increased between November 5 (the end of the 
ten day acceptance period in its proposal) and the date just after 
the middle of November on which Quintek received Herm Hughes's 
supplier agreement. 
IV. Quintek waived the ten day notice 
requirement in its bid. 
Perhaps the pivotal fact in this case is that Boyd Jacobson of 
Quintek went to Herm Hughes in mid-November 198 3 and requested a 
contract, Mr, Jacobson did so after the ten day acceptance period 
in Quintek's bid had expired, and after Mr. Gilson of the Oscar E. 
Chytraus Company had alerted Quintek that Herm Hughes was 
supposedly shopping Quintek's bid. When it received the supplier 
agreement, Quintek did not say anything about the ten-day 
acceptance period having lapsed. Quintek objected to the 
additional terms in the supplier agreement, but never objected to 
terms that harmonized with its proposal. Quintek submitted shop 
drawings, set up its job file, and had communications with Herm 
Hughes about the project. 
Quintek characterized this conduct as mere negotiation. But 
was it? Quintek did not ask for a proposal from Herm Hughes; it 
asked for a contract. Quintek expected to receive a contract even 
if Herm Hughes had signed its proposal32, indicating that Quintek 
considered the contract to be the consummation of the deal. 
What was Quintek negotiating about? Quintek presented no 
evidence that it expected any other terms than those contained in 
T. 141 11. 17-22. 
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its proposal (Exhibit 6). When it received the supplier's 
agreement it did not object to the terms in the supplier's 
agreement that were consistent with the terms in Quintek's 
proposal. Quintek submitted shop drawings, as required by the 
plans and specifications. Apparently Quintek believed it was 
negotiating only on the additional terms in the supplier's 
agreement. That conduct is not inconsistent with the idea that a 
contract was formed on the terms of Quintek's proposal. It does 
not demonstrate that Quintek was still asserting the lapse of the 
ten-day acceptance period in its proposal. 
Quintek cannot have it both ways. Quintek has presented no 
evidence and has asserted no argument tending to show that when it 
asked Herm Hughes for a contract, it had any other terms in mind 
than those contained in its original proposal. Therefore, if 
Quintek was seeking a contract, it was on those terms. Quintek 
cannot by its silence have the benefit of those terms and still 
assert that the proposal containing those terms has expired. It 
cannot on the one hand argue that it wanted a contract, and on the 
other hand argue that it did not waive the ten-day acceptance 
period in its proposal. 
V. Herm Hughes^ appeal is meritorious and not 
subject to sanctions under Rule 33(a). 
An appeal is not frivolous if it has a reasonable basis in 
fact and law.33 Among the facts that form the basis for this 
appeal are the exchange of Quintek's proposal and Herm Hughes's 
33
 Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Maughan v. 
Maucrhan, 770 P.2d. 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989). 
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appeal are the exchange of Quintek's proposal and Herm Hughes's 
supplier agreement, which overlap on the critical terms for the 
supply of wood trusses; the fact that Mr. Boyd Jacobson, the 
president of Quintek, went to Herm Hughes well after the ten day 
acceptance period in Quintek's proposal had expired and asked for 
a contract; and the facts that Quintek prepared and sent to Herm 
Hughes shop drawings, prepared a job file, and kept a log of 
communications between Herm Hughes and Quintek regarding the 
project. Herm Hughes believes these facts and this conduct 
evidence a contract between the parties. 
Herm Hughes bases its legal arguments upon Utah Code Ann. 
§§70A-2-207 and 2-204. Herm Hughes believes that these statutes 
apply very helpfully and very directly to the issues in this case. 
This appears to be a case of first impression for the application 
of § 2-207(1). Herm Hughes has cited case law from other 
jurisdictions together with well-recognized authorities on the 
Uniform Commercial Code in support of its position. Finally, Herm 
Hughes believes that, even if its appeal is unsuccessful, the 
result of this appeal will be greater understanding about the role 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, particularly § 2-207, in the 
relationship between contractors and suppliers in the construction 
industry. Herm Hughes respectfully submits that this is not the 
kind of appeal for which sanctions should be imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts and arguments critical to decision of this case are 
properly before this Court on appeal. Those issues include an 
20 
provide a basis for concluding that a contract was formed between 
Herm Hughes and Quintek for the supply of roof trusses. Those 
issues also include whether Quintek waived the ten day acceptance 
period in its proposal when it requested a contract from Herm 
Hughes. On these issues Herm Hughes is entitled to a reversal of 
the trial court and an entry of judgment in its favor. That ruling 
will vindicate a contractor's expectation that its suppliers will 
honor their bids according to their terms, and will give guidance 
to the construction industry in the critical context of contract 
formation. 
Respectfully submitted this day of October, 1991. 
HOWELL, FETZER & HENDRICKSON 
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ADDENDUM A 
STATUTES 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
those relating to the present or future sale of goods. 
' 'Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of 
goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A 
"sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to 
the buyer for a price (Section 70A-2-401). A "present 
sale" means a sale which is accomplished by the mak-
ing of the contract. 
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a perfor-
mance are "conforming" or conform to the contract 
when they are in accordance with the obligations un-
der the contract. 
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursu-
ant to a power created by agreement or law puts an 
end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On 
"termination" all obligations which are still execu-
tory on both sides are discharged but any right based 
on prior breach or performance survives. 
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts 
an end to the contract for breach by the other and its 
effect is the same as tha t of "termination" except tha t 
the canceling party also retains any remedy for 
breach of the whole contract or any unperformed bal-
ance. 1965 
70A-2-107. Goods to be severed from realty — 
Recording. 
(1) A contract for the sale of minerals or the like 
(including oil or gas) or a structure or its materials to 
be removed from realty is a contract for the sale of 
goods within this chapter if they are to be severed by 
the seller but until severance a purported present 
sale thereof which is not effective as a transfer of an 
interest in land is effective only as a contract to sell. 
(2) A contract for the sale apart from the land of 
growing crops or other things attached to realty and 
capable of severance without material harm thereto 
but not described in Subsection (1) or of timber to be 
cut is a contract for the sale of goods within this chap-
ter whether the subject mat ter is to be severed by the 
buyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the 
realty at the time of contracting, and the parties can 
by identification effect a present sale before sever-
ance. 
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any 
third party rights provided by the law relating to re-
alty records, and the contract for sale may be exe-
cuted and recorded as a document transferring an 
interest in land and shall then constitute notice to 
third parties of the buyer's rights under the contract 
for sale. 1977 
PART 2 
FORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT 
OF CONTRACT 
70A-2-201. Formal requirements — Statute of 
frauds. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a 
contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or 
more is not enforceable by way of action or defense 
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate 
tha t a contract for sale has been made between the 
parties and signed by the party against whom en-
forcement is sought or by his authorized agent or bro-
ker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or 
incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract 
is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the 
quanti ty of goods shown in such writing. 
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable t ime 
a writing in confirmation of the contract and suffi-
cient against the sender is received and the party 
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satis-
fies the requirements of Subsection (1) against such 
party unless written notice of objection to its contents 
is given within ten days after it is received. 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the require-
ments of Subsection (1) but which is valid in other 
respects is enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufac-
tured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale 
to others in the ordinary course of the seller's 
business and the seller, before notice of repudia-
tion is received and under circumstances which 
reasonably indicate tha t the goods are for the 
buyer, has made either a substantial beginning 
of their manufacture or commitments for their 
procurement; or 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is 
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or oth-
erwise in court tha t a contract for sale was made, 
but the contract is not enforceable under this pro-
vision beyond the quanti ty of goods admitted; or 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment 
has been made and accepted or which have been 
received and accepted (Section 70A-2-606). 1965 
70A-2-202. Final written expression — Parol or 
extrinsic evidence. 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory 
memoranda of the parties agree or which are other-
wise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as 
a final expression of their agreement with respect to 
such terms as are included therein may not be contra-
dicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a con-
temporaneous oral agreement but may be explained 
or supplemented 
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Sec-
tion 70A-1-205) or by course of performance (Sec-
tion 70A-2-208); and 
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms 
unless the court finds the writing to have been 
intended also as a complete and exclusive state-
ment of the terms of the agreement. 1965 
70A-2-203. Seals inoperative. 
The affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a 
contract for sale or an offer to buy or sell goods does 
not constitute the writing a sealed instrument and 
the law with respect to sealed instruments does not 
apply to such a contract or offer. 1965 
70A-2-204. Formation in general. 
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any 
manner sufficient to show agreement, including con-
duct by both parties which recognizes the existence of 
such a contract. 
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract 
for sale may be found even though the moment of its 
making is undetermined. 
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a 
contract for sale does not fail for indefmiteness if the 
parties have intended to make a contract and there is 
a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate 
remedy. 1965 
70A-2-205. Firm offers. 
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a 
signed writing which by its terms gives assurance 
tha t it will be held open is not revocable, for lack ot 
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is 
stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may 
such period of irrevocability exceed three months; o 
any such term of assurance on a form supplied by 
offeree must be separately signed by the offeror. 
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70A-2-206. Offer and acceptance in formation of 
contract. 
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by 
the language or circumstances 
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be con-
strued as inviting acceptance in any manner and 
by any medium reasonable in the circumstances; 
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for 
prompt or current shipment shall be construed as 
inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise 
to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of 
nonconforming goods, but such a shipment of 
nonconforming goods does not constitute an ac-
ceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the 
buyer tha t the shipment is offered only as an 
accommodation to the buyer. 
(2) Where the beginning of a requested perfor-
mance is a reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror 
who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable 
time may treat the offer as having lapsed before ac-
ceptance. 1965 
70A-2-207. Additional terms in acceptance or 
confirmation. 
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of accep-
tance or a written confirmation which is sent within a 
reasonable time operates as an acceptance even 
though it states terms additional to or different from 
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is ex-
pressly made conditional on assent to the additional 
or different terms. 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as pro-
posals for addition to the contract. Between mer-
chants such terms become part of the contract unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the 
terms of the offer; 
(b) they materially alter it; or 
(c) notification of objection to them has al-
ready been given or is given within a reasonable 
time after notice of them is received. 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the 
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a con-
tract for sale although the writings of the parties do 
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the 
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms 
on which the writings of the parties agree, together 
with any supplementary terms incorporated under 
any other provisions of this act. 1965 
70A-2-208. Course of performance or practical 
construction. 
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated 
occasions for performance by either party with knowl-
edge of the nature of the performance and opportu-
nity for objection to it by the other, any course of 
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objec-
tion shall be relevant to determine the meaning of 
the agreement. 
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any 
such course of performance, as well as any course of 
dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed when-
ever reasonable as consistent with each other; but 
when such construction is unreasonable, express 
terms shall control course of performance and course 
of performance shall control both course of dealing 
and usage of trade (Section 70A-1-205). 
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on 
modification and waiver, such course of performance 
shall be relevant to show a waiver or modification of 
any term inconsistent with such course of perfor-
mance. 1965 
70A-2-209. Modif icat ion, resc i ss ion a n d wa ive r . 
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this 
chapter needs no consideration to be binding. 
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modifica-
tion or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be 
otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as be-
tween merchants such a requirement on a form sup-
plied by the merchant must be separately signed by 
the other party. 
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds sec-
tion of this chapter (Section 70A-2-201) must be satis-
fied if the. contract as modified is within its provi-
sions. 
(4) Although an at tempt at modification or rescis-
sion does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection 
(2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver. 
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an 
executory portion of the contract may retract the 
waiver by reasonable notification received by the 
other party that strict performance will be required of 
any term waived, unless the retraction would be 
unjust in view of a material change of position in 
reliance on the waiver. 1965 
70A-2-210. Delegation of performance — As-
signment of rights. 
(1) A party may perform his duty through a dele-
gate unless otherwise agreed or unless the other 
party has a substantial interest in having his original 
promisor perform or control the acts required by the 
contract. No delegation of performance relieves the 
party delegating of any duty to perform or any liabil-
ity for breach. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either 
seller or buyer can be assigned except where the as-
signment would materially change the duty of the 
other party, or increase materially the burden or risk 
imposed on him by his contract, or impair materially 
his chance of obtaining return performance. A right 
to damages for breach of the whole contract or a right 
arising out of the assignor's due performance of his 
entire obligation can be assigned despite agreement 
otherwise. 
(3) Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary 
a prohibition of assignment of "the contract" is to be 
construed as barr ing only the delegation of (to) the 
assignee of the assignor's performance. 
(4) An assignment of "the contract" or of "all my 
rights under the contract" or an assignment in simi-
lar general terms is an assignment of rights and un-
less the language or the circumstances (as in an as-
signment of (for) security) indicate the contrary, it is 
a delegation of performance of the duties of the as-
signor and its acceptance by the assignee constitutes 
a promise by him to perform those duties. This prom-
ise is enforceable by either the assignor or the other 
party to the original contract. 
(5) The other party may t reat any assignment 
which delegates performance as creating reasonable 
grounds for insecurity and may without prejudice to 
his rights against the assignor demand assurances 
from the assignee (Section 70A-2-609). 1965 
PART 3 
GENERAL OBLIGATION AND 
CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT 
70A-2-301. General ob l iga t ions of p a r t i e s . 
The obligation of the seller is to transfer and de-
liver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in 
accordance with the contract. 1965 
70A-2-302. U n c o n s c i o n a b l e c o n t r a c t o r c lause . 
(1) If the court as a mat ter of law finds the contract 
ADDENDUM B 
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL EXCERPTS 
1
 there's part performance, I don't think that because they 
2 have led us to believe that they fre performing, now they 
3
 can stand back and say there's no written agreement. That 
4
 just does not seem to be the facts in this case. We have 
5 an oral contract here, they don't have to imply anything. 
6 It's clear that the parties had reached an 
7 agreement, the terms are clearly defined. Each of the 
8 documents that have received so much emphasis, Plaintiff's 
9 Exhibit 6 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, both of them contain 
10 the same terras. There are no material new terras in Exhibit 
11 11. 
12 Any time anybody bids, when they submit that bid, 
13 they admit that they're bidding in accordance with plans 
14 and specifications. They have to provide, as we required 
15 in the plans and specifications, they have to be an ICBO 
)6 approved truss shop. They have to prove—provide six shop 
17 drawings, and right on down the line, each of the provisions 
18 that are in the supplier agreement are really just implying 
19 to the contract, there's nothing there that is any 
20 substantial modification. 
21 And they even picked up the language, and I won't 
22 try to jerk that for you, as Mr. Lambert has, I think you 
23 can read that paragraph that talks about v/hat the discount 
24 is for, and I think the discount was granted in accordance 
25 with their wish* They just didn't deliver the trusse •ncrcpq Q< 
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THE COURT: Well, I intend to examine all of 
them. 
MR. WEEKS: I know you will. And anyway, it's 
clear, your Honor, that Ilr. Jacobsen said that he would 
not have been surprised to have a written contract 
presented to him, and in fact, a written supplier agreement 
was presented to him. 
THE COURT: Although he was expecting a purchase 
order, that was his statement. 
MR. WEEKS: That's— 
THE COURT: That's what he thought he was going 
to get, but he didn't, and so he—then we turn our 
attention to the other document. 
MR. WEEKS: And we believe, your Honor, that 
contrary to Counsel's argument that the—the differences 
in the Exhibit No. 11 are de minimus as to the items that 
have heen added to the performance. 
Exhibit 6 says--
THE COURT: They may very well be, Mr. Weeks. I 
hate to keep interrupting you here, but I think that the 
UCC is going to come into play much more than either of you 
22 have indicated to the Court before this is through. 
MR. WEEKS: Well, but even the Code, your Honor, 
requires that the—the counter-offers be— 
THE COURT: Yeah, but it handles a lot of the 
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other problems that have arisen in this particular case. 
And that's what I'm—all I'm saying is that there are a 
lot of problems that the Code treats directly by one or 
other—or another section in sales relating to matters of 
this nature that I think we're going to have to give some 
consideration to, thatfs both with respect to what 
Mr. Lambert is claiming and with respect to what you're 
claiming. 
In fact, I glanced at it during our recess and it 
is replete with sections that bear directly on the problem 
that you're presenting to me, and I'm not asking you to 
refer to them and expound on them at this time. I just 
want you to know that I know that there's a lot of law there 
that I'm going to have to take a hard look at and try and 
see if it will help me resolve the factual issues, some 
of which may be important and some may not. 
MR. WEEKS: And indeed, your Honor, that's the 
reason why we're here. 
I think, your Honor, you must give consideration 
to the fact that we have here documents on both sides which 
indicate that for some period of 60 to 90 days, these 
parties were progressing down the road to building trusses 
to be placed in the school, and—and for the defense to 
claim that all this time, they were waiting for some 
clarification of their authority, Mr. Jacobsen has testified 
11 
There's some reason, your Honor, that all of a 
sudden, in February, some three months later, that the 
defendant had decided they would not perform. And never, 
until this point, was there any indication that they would 
5
 J not perform the contract. 
And we can speculate about the necessity for a 
writing. We can speculate on the question of whether the 
8
 I parties reached a contract agreement on a given d a y — 
9
 THE COURT: Well, we've got almost 30 exhibits. 
10
 I There's lots of writing in this situation. 
MR. WEEKS: And I believe, your Honor, that the 
12 I writing on both sides is corroborative. It indicates that 
13 J the parties were heading in the direction where there was 
going to be the performance that was expected, in both 
instances by both parties. On the dollar amount, and the 
only thing they had not agreed was on the terms regarding 
the time of delivery. And those are the matters that are 
shown in the documents when they were talking about 
exchanging plans and setting verification dates, and the 
20 I other elements of the contract that were, of course, not 
21 J included in either of the proposals. 
We think, your Honor, that the test ought to be 
23 | whether the parties reached an agreement. We think they 
24 did. Wa r h m k chere were minor matters that may be taken 
25 care of by the Cede, and we think ther2 are minor matters 
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1 that are de minimus that did not affect the ability of the 
2 parties to reach an agreement. 
3 The objections that were had to the plans and 
4 specifications being included in the supplier agreement, 
5 right on their Exhibit 6, they wrote being in accordance 
6 with plans and specifications. That seemed to be one of 
7 the big problems. 
8 And those plans and specifications require every 
9 I bidder to assume the obligations of the contract in 
connection with their subcontract, not the overall 
interpretation, and if Mr. Jacobsen thought he was somehow 
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12 stepping into the shoes of Herm Hughes & Sons as a general 
contractor, that's just a mistaken notion. 
14 And the sub—the supplier agreement did not 
incorporate substantially or materially different form of 
agreement than that which they had submitted; in fact, it 
17 was materially the same. 
We believe, your Honor, that we're entitled to 
judgment. We believe that we're entitled to judgment for 
the additional costs that were required over and above 
the bid amount, including that amount for which the discount 
would have included, and the reason being that it would 
seem that we didn't give the plaintiffs an opportunity to 
see whether they would have earned the discount, because 
the defendants gave notice in February they wouldn?t 
i m 
ADDENDUM C 
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED PROPOSED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
• I L I 
CIRCL.T :P;;^T OF 
C R £ " 
CLErC 
HH5 3Q I I 1 7 AH ' 3 0 
D. DAVID LAMBERT (187"), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
p:quin-fof.lo 
Our File No. 15,669 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT 
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 883000004 
The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the 13th 
day of August, 1990, before the Hon. Robert J. Sumsion, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs president, 
Glen Hughes, was present and plaintiff was represented by its counsel, E. Nordell Weeks. 
Defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, was present and defendant was represented by its 
attorney, D. David Lambert The Court received the evidence of the parties and has 
considered the arguments of counsel, together with the legal authorities presented, and now 
makes the following: 
c 1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff corporation is a general contractor doing business within the 
State of Utah. 
2. The defendant is a Utah corporation in the business of manufacturing roof 
trusses and other building components which are supplied as finished products without 
doing work on the job site. 
3. In late October, 1983, the defendant became aware of the-possibility of 
bidding on the Midland Elementary School to be constructed in Roy, Utah. This 
information came through the Intermountain Contractor bidding service, and an agent of 
the defendant corporation reviewed the materials available in the form of plans showing 
the design criteria. Defendant prepared preliminary drawings and otherwise acted to 
prepare an estimate of its cost to provide roof trusses for the school in question. 
4. On October 25, 1983, defendant communicated to plaintiff by telephone a 
bid proposal which had been reduced to writing and which was mailed to plaintiff the same 
day that the verbal communication took place. 
5. Plaintiff received the defendant's written bid proposal on October 27, 1983, 
as indicated by its date stamp placed thereon. Said document was received by the Court as 
Exhibit 6. 
6. Defendant's written bid proposal, (Exhibit 6) specified that the offer was 
to be accepted within ten days and provided a space at the bottom of the written document 
for plaintiff to sign in acceptance. 
7. Plaintiff never signed the bid proposal of the defendant. 
2 
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8. Plaintiff used defendant's bid in an effort to convince Larry Gilson of 
Oscar E. Chytraus Co. to reduce his bid proposal. Larry Gilson contacted defendant's 
president, Boyd Jacobson, and advised him of plaintiff's bid shopping. 
9. The only written response of the plaintiff which directly addressed the 
terms of the bid proposal was made under cover letter dated November 21, 1983, and was 
in the form of a Supplier Agreement. The cover letter and Supplier Agreement were 
received by the Court as Exhibit 11. Exhibit , containing the notes of Don Brown, an 
employee of the defendant, gives reason to believe that Exhibit 11 was received by the 
defendant on or about November 30, 1983. 
10. Defendant refused to sign the Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) and 
defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, had discussions with employees of the plaintiff stating 
his refusal to sign the Supplier Agreement. 
11. The Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) contains various terms which are 
different than the defendant's bid proposal (Exhibit 6), including the following terms: 
a. Specific terms concerning indemnification and assuming an 
obligation directly to the owner. 
b. Language allowing the contractor to retain 10% of the purchase 
price until completion of the project. 
c. Provisions concerning liquidated damages. 
12. Certain shop drawings were done preliminary to defendant's submission of 
the bid proposal to the plaintiff. It is unclear which drawings were later submitted to 
plaintiff, but certain drawings were sent and discussions occurred relative to possible 
performance by defendant in fabricating the trusses in question. 
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13. Defendant never began fabrication of the trusses and never produced any 
of the trusses for the school in question. 
14. Plaintiff admitted that the date or time when its alleged agreement came 
into existence cannot be ascertained. 
The Court having made the above Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There was never a meeting of minds of the parties on the essential terms 
of an agreement. 
2. Plaintiff rejected defendant's bid by attempting to shop the bid to the next 
lowest bidder. 
2. Any agreement between the parties was required to be in writing pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201, unless excused by one of the exclusions stated therein. 
None of the exclusions stated therein apply for the following reasons: a) the defendant is 
the only party, as the seller or supplier, who could make a claim as to specially manufac-
tured goods; b) defendant has never admitted the existence of a contract; and c) plaintiff 
made no payment for any goods or work of the defendant. 
3. No partial performance occurred in that no aspect of the final product to 
be supplied was ever fabricated, no step of fabrication, except preliminary drawings, was 
ever commenced and plaintiff never accepted or received any goods and plaintiff paid no 
monies to defendant 
4. Plaintiff alleged only a cause of action for breach of contract and no 
estoppel or reliance claims were pleaded or proven. 
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5. Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice costs to defendant. 
DATED this day of August, 1990. 
BY TTCE COURT. 
ROBERT J. SUMSION 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this 3*\ day of August, 1990. 
E. Nordell Weeks, Esq. 
136 South Main Street #320 
Salt LaKe City, UT 84101 
^n 
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HOWELL, FETZER & HENDRICKSON 
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Telephone: (801) 355-1503 
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HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC., 
A Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
QUINTEK, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
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OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS X3F LAW 
AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 883000004 
Plaintiff and appellant, Henri Hughes & Sons, Inc., 
through its counsel, Howell, Fetzer & Hendrickson, hereby 
objects to Defendant's Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law served on E. Nordell Weeks on August 29, 
1990 (the "August findings"), and objects to Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment proposed by defendants 
counsel and served on E. Nordell Weeks, counsel for plaintiff, 
on October 8, 1990 (the "October findings"). For simplicity, 
plaintiff will refer only to the August findings, hereafter 
referred to as "defendant's Proposed Findings and 
Conclusions." By stipulation of counsel, the time for 
su; oiitting these objections has been extended to this date. 
1 
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff objects to the portion of finding no. 3, 
in the second sentence, that reads: "in the form of plans 
showing the design criteria," and the portion of the third 
sentence in finding no. 3 that reads "defendant prepared 
preliminary drawings." Stan Jacobson testified that he "would 
assume" that the materials available for the bid were in the 
form of plans. The person who prepared the bid, Don Brown, 
did not testify. The statement that defendant prepared 
preliminary drawings in preparation of its estimate is not 
supported by the record. Again, Stan Jacobson testified that 
he "would assume" that computer generated drawings were 
produced. He did not testify when those drawings were 
produced. 
2. Plaintiff objects to finding no. 8 in its entirety. 
The first sentence of finding no. 8 is counsel's 
characterization of the testimony of Mr. Gillson. Mr. Gillson 
referred to plaintifffs actions as "bid shopping" but that was 
the conclusion drawn by Mr. Gillson. There is no foundation 
for Mr. Gillsonfs opinion and the evidence does not support 
his characterization. Plaintiff further objects to finding 
no. 8 on the ground that it is irrelevant, immaterial and 
unnecessary to a decision of the case. Defendant's counsel 
did not even refer to this evidence in closing arguments. The 
finding is also highly prejudicial. 
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3. Plaintiff objects to finding no. 9 because the 
letter and supply agreement were not the only written response 
of plaintiff that directly addressed the terms of the bid 
proposal of defendant. One of the terms of the bid proposal 
was to supply roof trusses in accordance with plans and 
specifications. Those plans and specifications require 
Quintek to provide shop drawings. Plaintiff exchaned written 
correspondence with defendant regarding the shop drawings. 
4. Plaintiff objects to finding no. 10. Boyd 
Jacobson had discussions with Todd Walker, an employee of 
plaintiff. Mr. Jacobsonfs testimony did not refer to 
discussions with any other employee of plaintiff in which Mr. 
Jacobson stated his refusal to sign the supplier agreement. 
5. Plaintiff objects to finding no. 11(a) because 
some of the additional terms in the supplier agreement are not 
different from defendant's bid proposal. Defendants bid 
proposal included an undertaking to prepare roof trusses "per 
plans and specifications." Plaintiff had the same obligations 
to the owner. Therefore, under defendant's bid proposal, 
defendant had some of the same obligations to plaintiff that 
plaintiff had to the owner. 
6. Plaintiff objects to finding no. 12 because there 
was no evidence that, for this specific project, shop drawings 
were done preliminary to defendant's submission of the bid 
proposal to plaintiff. Further, it is not unclear which 
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drawings were submitted to plaintiff. The drawings that were 
submitted are shown in Exhibits 8, 13, 14 and 15. 
7. Plaintiff objects to finding no. 13 because the 
phrase "never began fabrication" is overly broad, conclusory, 
and does not reflect the evidence that shows various 
activities of the defendant related to the fabrication of the 
trusses. 
8. Plaintiff objects to finding no. 14. It is true 
that counsel for plaintiff admitted in his opening statement 
that the exact time when the agreement came into existence 
cannot be determined, but counsel!s statement is not an 
admission by plaintiff and is not evidence. It is therefore 
inappropriate to base a finding of fact on counsel's 
statement. 
9. Plaintiff objects to the findings generally in that 
they are incomplete and omit critical facts. 
PLAINTIFFS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff accordingly further requests the court to 
make the following specific findings of fact: 
1. Plaintiff, a corporation, is a general contractor 
engaged in the construction business in Utah. 
2. Defendant is a Utah corporation in the business of 
manufacturing roof trusses and other building components which 
are supplied as finish products without doing work on the 
jobsite. 
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3. This action arose out of a project for the 
construction of the Midland Elementary School in Roy, Utah 
(the "project"), for the Weber School District, owner, for 
which plaintiff was the general contractor. 
4. The project was to be constructed pursuant to plans 
and specifications prepared by John L. Piers, the architect 
for the project. 
5. The portion of the plans and specifications for the 
project dealing with the wood trusses was set forth in the 
General Conditions and General Requirements, Division 1 and 
Division 6, WOOD & PLASTIC, Section 6010—lumber and related 
items, along with Addendum 1 of the specifications, and the 
drawings of John L. Piers. 
6. In late October, 1983, defendant became aware of 
the possibility of bidding on the project. This information 
came through the Intermountain Contractor bidding service. 
Defendant prepared an estimate of its cost to provide roof 
trusses for the project. 
7. On October 25, 1983, defendant communicated to 
plaintiff by telephone a bid proposal which had been reduced 
to writing and which was mailed to plaintiff the same day that 
the verbal communication took place. 
8. Various other suppliers of wood trusses submitted 
bids to plaintiff for the wood trusses required on the 
project. 
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9. Plaintiff used defendant's bid for the trusses in 
plaintiff's bid to the owner on the project (Exhibit 7). 
10. Plaintiff received defendant's written bid 
proposal on October 27, 1983, as indicated by plaintiff's 
date-stamp placed thereon. Said document was received by the 
Court as Exhibit 6. 
11. Defendant's written bid proposal (Exhibit 6) 
proposed to supply the roof trusses for the project, f.o.b. 
jobsite, per plans and specifications, for a price of 
v $42,518.00, less an eight percent discount of $3,401.44, if 
taken in ten days for a net proposal of $39,116.56. 
12. Defendant's written bid proposal (Exhibit 6) 
specified that the estimate was to be accepted within ten days 
from October 25, 1983, and provided a space at the bottom of 
the written bid proposal for plaintiff to sign in acceptance. 
13. Defendant's written bid proposal (Exhibit 6) was 
signed by defendant. 
14. Plaintiff never signed the bid proposal of the 
defendant. 
15. Defendant assumed that, if plaintiff had signed 
defendant's bid proposal (Exhibit 6), a contract would be 
forthcoming from plaintiff. 
16. In about the middle of November, 19 83, Boyd 
Jacobson, then President of defendant, spoke by telephone with 
Todd Walker, an employee of plaintiff, and inquired why 
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defendant had not yet received a supply contract for the 
supply of the trusses. 
17. At the time that Boyd Jacobson spoke with Todd 
Walker in mid-November 1983, plaintiff had not yet received a 
contract from the owner for construction of the project. 
18. A few days after the telephone conversation 
between Boyd Jacobson and Todd Walker in mid-November, 1983, 
Boyd Jacobson went to the offices of plaintiff to ask for a 
supply contract and to pick up a set of plans for the 
manufacture of the trusses, 
19. Plaintiff sent a Supplier Agreement to defendant 
under cover of plaintiff's letter dated November 21, 1983. 
These documents were received by the court as Exhibit 11. 
20. The supplier agreement enclosed with plaintifffs 
letter of November 21, 1983 (Exhibit 11) included the 
following terms: defendant was to supply trusses to 
plaintiff, f.o b. jobsite, according to the plans and 
specifications for the project, at a price of $42,518, with a 
discount of eight percent, ten days. 
21. The supplier agreement (Exhibit 11) contained some 
terms that were additional to or different from the terms 
stated in defendant's bid proposal (Exhibit 6). 
22. Defendant refused to sign the supplier agreement 
(Exhibit 11) and defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, had 
discussions with Todd Walker, an employee of plaintiff, 
regarding his objections to the supplier agreement. 
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23. Defendant did not provide written notice of its 
objection to the supplier agreement (Exhibit 11) within ten 
days after defendant received it. 
24. The plans and specifications for the project 
called for specific characteristics of the wood trusses, 
including specific design loads for the plates (Exhibits 8, 
13, 14, and 15). 
25. Defendant sent shop drawings for the project to 
plaintiff, under cover of a letter dated December 13, 1983 
(Exhibit 8). 
26. On December 14, 1983, Todd Walker, an employee of 
plaintiff, spoke with a person at defendant's office in Provo 
regarding his objections to sending the shop drawings to Mr. 
Walker. (Exhibit 12). 
27. On December 15, 1983, plaintiff received the shop 
drawings sent by defendant (Exhibits 8 and 13) . 
28. Also on December 15, 1983, plaintiff sent 
defendant's shop drawings to E. W. Allen & Associates, the 
engineer for the project, for the engineer's review (Exhibit 
14). 
29. On December 20, 1983, Todd Walker spoke with Don 
at Quintek regarding the shop drawings (Exhibit 12). 
30. On December 30, 1983, Todd Walker spoke with Don 
at Quintek regarding starting fabrication of the trusses 
(Exhibit 12). 
8 
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31. On January 3 or January 4, 1984, Todd Walker spoke 
with Don at Quintek regarding the design load for the plates 
of the trusses (Exhibit 12). 
32. On January 5, 1984, plaintiff received from John 
L. Pierce, copies of the shop drawings prepared by defendant, 
containing a notation regarding "load factor for plate design 
1.33 x design load." (Exhibit 16). 
33. On or about January 6, 1984, Todd Walker sent to 
Quintek shop drawings "approved as noted" with the request to 
begin fabrication and to submit the remaining shop drawings 
(Exhibit 17). 
34. Defendant maintained a record of the project, 
including a record of its contacts with plaintiff regarding 
the project. A portion of this record was admitted as Exhibit 
20. 
35. In January 1984, plaintiff notified defendant that 
the engineer and/or the architect who had reviewed defendant's 
shop drawings had indicated a load factor for the plate design 
of 1.33 x design load. 
36. On or about February 8, 1984, defendant informed 
Dale Higgs, an employee of plaintiff, that defendant would not 
be supplying the roof trusses for the project. 
37. In late February 1984 plaintiff received a 
proposal from defendant to supply the trusses for the project 
for $48,000. Defendant's proposal was presented to Glenn C. 
Hughes, president of plaintiff, by Bill Norris, an employee of 
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defendant, and was reduced to a written proposal dated 
February 22, 1984, which was admitted as Exhibit 19. 
38. Defendant never supplied any of the trusses for 
the project. 
39. By their conduct and by their writings, plaintiff 
and defendant made a contract for the sale of the roof trusses 
by defendant to plaintiff on the following terms: defendant 
would supply roof trusses to plaintiff per plans and 
specifications, f.o.b. jobsite, at a price of $42,518.00, less 
an 8 percent discount, if taken in 10 days, of $3,401.44, for 
a net amount of $39,116.56. 
40. Due to defendant's failure to supply the roof 
trusses for the agreed price, plaintiff was required to obtain 
the roof trusses from another supplier. 
41. Plaintiff attempted to mitigate its costs of 
having the roof trusses supplied by others, by contacting the 
next lowest bidders among the roof truss suppliers on the 
project, but these suppliers could not supply the roof 
trusses. 
42. The cost to plaintiff of obtaining the roof 
trusses for the project from another supplier is $8,695.44. 
(Exhibits 22 and 24). 
43. Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of 
$8,695.44 as a result of defendant's breach of the agreement 
to supply the trusses at the agreed price (Exhibits 22 and 
24) . 
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44. Plaintiff has incurred costs in this action, and 
has requested in its complaint that it be awarded its costs. 
Plaintiff objects to defendant's proposed Conclusions 
of Law as follows: 
1. Plaintiff objects to Conclusion no. 1. There was a 
meeting of the minds of the parties on the essential terms of 
an agreement for the supply of roof trusses, which essential 
terms were: defendant would supply roof trusses according to 
plans and specifications for the project, f.o.b. jobsite, at a 
price of $42,518.00, less an 8% discount, 10 days, of 
$3,401.44, for a net amount of $39,116.56. 
2. Plaintiff objects to Conclusion no. 2 because it is 
a characterization by an unqualified witness (see plaintiff's 
objection no. 2 to defendant's proposed findings of fact, 
above) and because it is irrelevant, immaterial, and 
unnecessary to the court's determination. It is also highly 
prejudicial. 
3. Plaintiff objects to the second sentence of the 
second Conclusion no. 2 (there are two conclusions number 2 in 
the August conclusions) for the following reasons: 
(a) Any party, plaintiff or defendant, can claim the 
benefit of Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-201(3) (a) (regarding 
specially manufactured goods); otherwise the statute violates 
the principle of mutuality of contracts; the evidence supports 
the conclusion that the trusses were to be specially 
manufactured for the project; and 
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(b) The evidence presented in court demonstrates that 
defendant recognized the existence of a contract by its 
conduct and the writings of the parties. 
4. Plaintiff objects to Conclusion no. 3. The conduct 
of defendant listed in plaintiff's proposed findings shows a 
substantial beginning of the manufacture of the roof trusses 
by defendant. Under the terms of the contract established by 
the conduct and the writings of the parties, it was not 
necessary that plaintiff pay defendant before receiving goods. 
5. Plaintiff objects to Conclusion No. 4. Plaintiff's 
Complaint alleges in paragraph 6 that plaintiff used 
defendant's bid in computing its general contract bid to the 
Weber County School District. Defendant cannot show prejudice 
for alleging estoppel or reliance. Defendant had available to 
it the critical documents and information that would disclose 
the conduct and the writings of the parties that resulted in 
an agreement. Moreover, defendant prepared a trial brief in 
April 1990 that addresses the issue of promissory estoppel. 
6. Plaintiff objects to Conclusion No. 5, because on 
the basis of the foregoing proposed findings, the Court can 
and should find that plaintiff should recover its damages from 
defendant. No pleading of defendant or ruling of the court 
calls for an award of costs to defendant. 
PLAINTIFFfS PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff requests the court make the following 
specific conclusions of law: 
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1. The Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2, Utah 
Code Ann. §§70A-2-101 et seq,, applies to this action. 
2. Both plaintiff and defendant are merchants for 
purposes of §70A-2-104(1) and (3) and other sections of 
Article 2. 
3. The transaction that is the subject of this action, 
i.e. the sale of roof trusses by defendant to plaintiff, is a 
transaction "between merchants" for purposes of §70A-2-104(3) 
and other sections of Article 2. 
4. Plaintiff and defendant reached an agreement for 
the supply by defendant and the purchase by plaintiff of roof 
trusses for the project on the following terms: defendant was 
to supply wooden roof trusses, f.o.b. jobsite, according to 
the plans and specifications on the project, for the price of 
$42,518.00, less an 8% discount, 10 days, of $3,401.44, for a 
net price of $39,116.56. 
5. The conduct of both plaintiff and defendant, 
including the conduct referred to in plaintiff's proposed 
findings of fact set forth above, recognizes the existence of 
the contract. 
6. An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract 
for the sale of the roof trusses may be found even though the 
moment of its making is undetermined. 
7. Even though one or more terms of the supplier 
agreement (Exhibit 11) were left open, the contract between 
the parties for the sale of the roof trusses does not fail for 
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indefiniteness, because the parties intended to make a 
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving 
plaintiff a remedy. That basis is the terms of Exhibit 6 and 
Exhibit 11 on which the parties agreed. 
8. Plaintiff's supplier agreement (Exhibit 11) was a 
definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written 
confirmation of defendant's bid proposal, was sent within a 
reasonable time, and operated as an acceptance, even though it 
stated terms additional to or different from those contained 
in defendant's bid proposal. 
9. Conduct by both defendant and plaintiff, 
particularly the conduct set forth in plaintiff's proposed 
findings, recognizes the existence of a contract and was 
sufficient to establish a contract between plaintiff and 
defendant for sale of the roof trusses, even though 
defendant's bid proposal was not signed by plaintiff. 
10. By requesting a supply contact and a set of plans 
in mid-November 1983, and by its subsequent conduct described 
in plaintiff's proposed findings, defendant waived the 
requirement that its bid proposal be accepted within ten days 
of October 25, 1983. 
11. Plaintiff's letter of November 21, 1983, and the 
supplier agreement (Exhibit 11) satisfies the requirements of 
the Statute of Frauds §70A-2-201(1) and (2), against 
defendant. 
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12. If the agreement between plaintiff and defendant 
for the sale of roof trusses was oral, it is nevertheless 
enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, §70A-2-201(3) , 
because the goods were to be specially manufactured for 
plaintiff for use on the project, and defendant made a 
substantial beginning of the manufacture of the trusses as set 
forth in plaintiff's proposed findings of fact. 
13. Plaintiff and defendant have an enforceable 
contract for the sale of roof trusses for the project, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-204 and/or §70A-2-207. 
14. Defendant breached the contract for the sale of 
roof trusses by refusing to supply trusses at the agreed 
price. 
15. Plaintiff was damaged by defendant's breach in the 
amount of $8,695.44. 
16. Plaintiff properly mitigated its damages. 
17. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant 
the sum of $8,695.44 for breach of contract. 
18. Plaintiff is entitled to recover its costs 
incurred herein. 
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff objects to the proposed Judgment for the 
reasons set forth in its objections to defendant's proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Plaintiff 
specifically objects to Item #3 of the proposed Judgment 
awarding costs to defendant in the sum of $125.60. The court 
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has made no ruling nor received any evidence regarding 
defendant's costs. Moreover, defendant's answer does not 
request costs. 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff requests that the court enter the following 
judgment: 
1. Plaintiff shall and does hereby have judgment 
against defendant for the sum of $8,695.44. 
2. Plaintiff shall recover from defendant plaintiff's 
costs incurred herein. 
DATED this 29th day of October, 1990. 
HOWELL, FETZER & HENDRICKSON 
Lark B. Fetzer U Cl
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND PROPOSED JUDGMENT was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this 29th day of October 1990, to the following: 
D. David Lambert 
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellee 
P.O. Box 778 
12 0 East 3 00 North 
Provo, Utah 84603 
wcfb4-24 
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ADDENDUM E 
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING OF DECEMBER 5, 1990, EXCERPTS 
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22 
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1 take. Of course, Herm Hughes objects to the form of the 
2 ruling and the final order prepared by Mr. Lambert because 
3 it feels that there are some issues that have not been 
4 addressed and that's what I'd like to address some of my 
5 j comments to. 
6 I As I said, I wasn't at the hearing,but as I read 
7 the transcript, at the point of closing argument, it was 
8 apparent that the Court, that your Honor, was referring and 
g j had studied some portions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
which your Honor felt, at least as I read the transcript— 
u I and am paraphrasing, as I understand it, that your Honor 
12 felt that those provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code 
13 governed the transaction, the negotiations, the occurrences 
14 that were the subject: of this lawsuit. And I wholeheartedly j 
15 support that determination by your Honor and would simply 
point out with regards to some proposed findings and 
conclusions that we've made, and these don't come out in the 
18 | Proposed findings and conclusions by Quintek, by Mr. Lambert, 
that there art; some specific provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code that seem to apply just very helpfully in 
this case. They offer some guidance that I think is very 
useful. I happen to think they make a difference in the 
outcome. 
In any event, I believe they're applicable and 
wanted -co pursue that JL*I thi^ hearing. It's very simply put, 
1 Herm Hughes could characterize this case as a contract 
2 formation kind of a case that's governed by Section 2-204 and 
3 2-207 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
4
 Exhibit 6 produced at trial which was the Quintek 
5 proposal, contained some specifics, the quantity, the—per 
6 plans and specifications reference, the price, the F.O.B., 
7 I believe it was shipping point, but the F.O.&. terms and 
8 other elements of that offer. And Exhibit 11, which was the 
9 supplier agreement, which was the method by which Herm 
10 Hughes responded to the offer, was the acceptance. 
11 And the conduct of the parties, particularly the 
12 submittal of the shop drawings, which was called for by the 
13 contract and by the correspondence of the parties, also 
14 indicates that the parties believed that there was a 
15 contract and they proceeded in that manner. And this seems 
16 to me to be almost a law school examination type of 
17 question addressed to 2-204 and 2-207. 
18 And 2-207 comes into play because there were 
19 some provisions in that supplier agreement that Herm Hughes 
20 admits were different from the proposal made by Quintek. 
21 But under 2-207, those become part of the agreement unless 
22 they're objected to or unless they materially alter, and 
23 1%m paraphrasing, and tnat Code Section defines more clearly 
24 than I am by my paraphrasing, what the effect of those 
25 additional provisions are, but: let's assume that those 
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T additional provisions, such as liquidated damages, indemni-
2 fication and so on, are not part of the agreement, we still 
3 have an overlapping of the critical terms. The nature of 
4 the trusses, the plans and specifications, the price, the 
5 quantity, the shipping; those are the critical terms to 
6 form a contract. 
7 Your Honor was right, as I read the transcript, 
8 in saying that you thought that the U.C.C. had modified the 
9 J mirror image rule of contract formation. The commentary, as 
I understand it, and the cases that deal v/ith that issue 
confirm your Honor's understanding.that the mirror image 
rule, for purposes of contracts subject to the Uniform 
Commercial Code, is no longer governing and that an 
14 I acceptance that includes additional terms can nevertheless 
form a contract under the provisions, or s.ubject to the 
provisions of Article 2, Section 207, 2-207. 
Your Honor's ruling seemed to be concerned with the 
fact that Herm Hughes didn't sign Quintek's bid proposal. 
It could have done that and could have obviated all this 
difficulty by simply signing the bid proposal, and there's 
no question that they did not sign it. 
There—I have two responses to that, your Honor. 
One is that Quintek waived that requirement. More than ten 
days after that written bid proposal had been submitted, and 
there was a ten-day—they requested that within ten days 
11 
1 this bid proposal be accepted by signing on the bottom of 
2 the bid proposal, the bottom paragraph of Exhibit 6. More 
3 than ten days after that was submitted, Boyd Jacobson talked 
4 with TodJ Walker of Leriu Hughes and said, have you got a 
5 supplier agreement for me? And then he said a few days 
6 after that, he put that in mid-November, and then a few days 
7 after that, whatever raid-November was, he said—and with 
8 J your Honor's permission, 1*11 quote from the transcript, 
it's at Page 127, Line 2. "I went up to their office to 
asK for a contract and pick up a set of plans that was up 
there." So, he asked for a contract. 
9 
10 
11 
12 Your Honor, he waived any ten-day requirement and 
13 
14 
he re-opened tne offer, if you will, the offer was still 
open, he was still looking for a contract. And in response 
15 I to that request for a contract, Herm Hughes submitted this 
16 supplier agreement, j^nd the supplier agreement and the bid 
17 proposal of Quintet overlap on the critical terms, and I 
18 J believe we've got a—I relieve under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, we've got: a contract • 
There's a case that I could refer your Honor to 
that was similar in situation to that, it's the case of 
David J. Tuerney, Jr., Inc. vs. T. Wellington Carpets, Inc., 
which is a Ilassachusetts appellate Court case reported at 
3^ 2 li.E. 2d 10GG. I Lrougnt copies for your honor and for 
counjei, 1*11 share uiooc wxuii you, but that involved— 
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1 discount, it made Chytraus' bid the low bid. 
2 MR. LAMBERT: Correct. 
3 THE COURT: Now, does the record reveal that? 
4
 MR. FETZER: I believe so, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: That's the way I remember it. 
6 MR. LAMBERT: Exactly. 
7 THE COURT: And anyway, Mr. Gilson interpreted 
8 the approach to him as bid shopping, that's the word he 
9 used as I remember. 
10 MR. LAMBERT: Yes, and that's— 
11 THE COURT: Came down and says, do you know those 
12 guys are bid shopping with your bid. Now, I don't put any 
13 particular stock in the fact that they used the term bid 
14 shopping or anything else. Whether it was true or it wasn't 
15 true, I think there's an explanation for it. I think there 
16 was a question on the bids as to which one was low because 
17 of the discount quoted, and they were trying to find out 
18 which one would give them the best deal, 
19 Now, the testimony in the record as I remember it 
20 with respect to the discount is that Quintek didn't like 
21 this retainage situation it had generally utilized and they 
22 were willing to offer that ten percent discount if they 
23 could get paid and get out of this thing after they'd 
24 performed the job. 
25 MR. LAMBERT: Exactly. 
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THE COURT: And these other people at the time, I 
got the impression from somewhere—I dream about these thing^ 
at night after I hear them—they really hadn't made a 
4 | decision as to whether they wanted to take the ten percent 
or whether they wanted to go with the other bid. And thatfs 
what they were looking around for, which I think anybody in 
business would do, but the problem that it poses in this 
particular situation, is that you've got Gilson coming down 
and telling your people that they1re bid shopping with the 
bid. 
Now, the most that can be said about it was that 
the information was relayed to him. 
MR. LAMBERT: That's all it's in there for. 
THE COURT: And it got your people squirmish. I 
don't think there's any question about that. Those are the 
reactions that were observable a n d — 
MR. FETZER: W e l l — 
THE COURT: — s o what we're not—what we're doing 
here, we're not trying to reach conclusions that the 
plaintiff was bid shopping, but I think the—the relevant 
thing about that episode is that Quintek was told that and 
had some concerns about what was going on. And that's the 
only thing that it conveyed to the Court. 
MR. LAMBERT: And that's why it's there. 
THE COURT: And I think it's important that it go 
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1 in there, but I don't know how you particularly want to 
2 word it, but I don't think it ought to be worded so strong 
3 as to accuse them of bid shopping. 
4 MR. LAMBERT: Well, why don't we change that and 
5 say that— 
6 THE COURT: But I do think that the testimony, and 
7 it should be there in the record, was that Larry Gilson 
contacted Jacobson and said that the plaintiffs were bid 
shopping his bid. 
MR. FETZER: Your Honor, that's — 
THE COURT: Now, what does it say in there? That's] 
my recollection of it. You've got the record. 
MR. LAMBERT: He used those terms and I think that 
you—essentially said that, in your— 
MR. FETZER: I think— 
THE COURT: I mean, if someone comes to me and I 
was in your client's position and they said that they're up 
there using your bid to bid shop, I'd get a little excited 
about it. Anybody would, if they're normal. 
MR. FETZER: But this— 
THE COURT: But that—that's the most that can be 
said about that. 
MR. LAMBERT: His objection says Mr. Gilson 
referred to plaintiff's actions as, quote, "bid shopping", 
close quote. I'm assuming he got that from listening to 
30 
1 ten days went by, that there was nonetheless a contract 
2 formed. 
3 MR. FETZER: Your Honor, may I j u s t — 
4
 THE COURT: Well, no. Ifm just giving you my 
5 impressions, I'm not trying to argue one way or the other. 
6 And as we've lisconed to che explanations as to 
7 why they s^nt this and why they did chat and everything 
8 else, there was a definite impression made on the-Court 
9 thac if they could have got together and got this thing 
10 firmed up, I can't fix a date on it, they would have still 
11 gone ahead with it. 
12 Now, you've talked about waiver and maybe the 
13 Appellate Court will look at this thing and say, well, by 
14 doing this and doing that, they waived the right to declare 
15 the contract—that there v/as no binding contract. I donft 
16 know; but the thing that impressed me at the trial is that 
17 everything that Lerm Hughes came up with, these other 
18 people seexaed -co have a reasonable and a logical explanation 
19 for it apart from che fact that chey were intending to go 
20 forward with the contract:. They were accommodating, and 
21 thac may oe their downfall. 
22 I ^nd then it got down co the nitty-gritty and the 
sticky part of ic towards che end of the year, and I guess, 
when was it, it was clear into February, was it, before they 
23 
24 
25 f ina l ly said we've had enough and we{re not going to do i t . 
my court and Ifve got to do something with it, and if I don'ti 
do anything with it, the Court may end up saying youfve got a) 
contract* 
MR. FETZER: I may— 
MR. LAMBERT: Well, it— 
MR. FETZER: I may have misspoken myself there 
in that, my reading of the Code, and this is where I would 
really appreciate being set right, if I'm wrong. 
THE COURT: Weil, I don't know. 
MR. LAMBERT: Let me see if I can set you right. 
I've got a copy of the Code right here. 
THE COURT: You people know more than I do. 
MR. FETZER: I think the Code says that if you've 
got a counter-proposal that under—under non-U.C.C. contract 
law would normally kill the offer, but that proposal 
essentially meets the terms of the—excuse me, that counter-
offer essentially meets the terms of the proposal, you*ve 
got a contract on— 
MR. LAMBERT: Vie 11 — 
MR. FETZER: —on those points where it meets, 
and you don't have it on tihe other ones if they're material, 
but as between merchants, you do if there—the additional 
terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the 
contract—this is on the counter-proposal. Between 
merchants, such terms become part of the contract unless, 
4 
1 and then it lists some—unless the offer expressly limits 
2 acceptance to the terms of the offer or they materially 
3 alter it, or notification or objection to them as already 
been given, or is given within a reasonable time after notice] 
5 of that is received. 
6
 &nu I think Boyd Jacobson gave those timely, that 
7 no, we're not going to agree to A, h, C, and D, tut I don't 
8 think A, E, C, and D included the essential terns of the 
9 agreement. 
10 I 1ER. LAMEEM: Well — 
MR. FETZER: That's—that's my view of the case 
12 J and if I'm up in the night, I want to know it. 
13 THE COURT: Well, my problem is, I have some 
difficulty with maybe even the Code in a circumstance such 
as that. I don't think that a bidder ought to be put in 
tne position of having in every case to establish a contract 
17 with the person to whom he submitted that bid if that person 
nasn'i done something to confirm it, and I don't think these 
Herm Hughes people did. They w e r e — 
20 I >1£. FET22R: N o w — 
21 THE COURT: They were too b u s y — 
22 J MR. FETZER: I'm going to, at the risk o f — 
23 | THE COURT: — c o pay attention to that thing. 
24 | That's an impression 1 got. 
25 HE. FETTER; 
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1 THE COURT: It's not going to go in the findings, 
2 that's just between us girls. 
3 MR. FET2ER: What about that supplier agreement, 
4 your Honor? Is—didn't t h a t — 
5 THE COURT: That was a Johnny-come-lately thing 
6 that gives me some problems, but I don't think that it's 
7 the type of thing than is going to make a contract in this 
8 case. You may convince the Appellate Court to the contrary, 
9 but I gave you my impressions, and after I sat through this 
10 thing, I couldn't, in good conscience, find sufficient 
n evidence, as far as I was concerned, to find in favor of your 
12 Pa-ty. 
13 MR. LAMBERT: And I am supposed to be back at my 
14 office at 4:00 o'clock. I thought that two hours would be 
15 plenty. 
16 THE COURT: We're going to let you go. 
17 Should have been. 
18 MS- LAMBERT: I have some thoughts on the subject 
•chat I'd like to talk to you about — 
MR. FETZER: I'd welcome that, thank you. 
MR. LAMBERT: — t h a t , because I, obviously, would 
like to try to convince you that there's some questions in 
my mind about your application of this statute to the facts 
of this case. And I think, you know, the Judge has given 
you his feelings on that, and I think 1 c a n — 
i the Court is unable to ascertain from the evidence the date 
2 or time when an agreeraent caiae into existence, but I donft 
3 know as that's necessary. I just—I'm finding that there was] 
4
 no agreement— 
5 MR. LAMBERT: Right. I'll j u s t — 
6 THE COURT: --that ever caine into existence. 
7 MPs. LAMBERT: That's fine. I'll j u s t — 
8 THE COURT: So, why do we need t o — 
9 MR. LAMBERT: —delete chat. 
10 THE COURT: Why do we need something that says 
11 that we can't ascertain it% I — 
12 MR. LAMBERT: ' I'll delete it. 
13 MR. FETSER: Delete all of 14? 
14 THE COURT: X don't know, I j u s t — 
15 MR. FETSER: I had an objections- to the conclusions1 
16 of law, nuiiiber one, that we wcnft resolve here today and 
17 number two, your Honor, I guess 1 have to defer to you on 
18 that. I sense that you have a question whether that was a 
19 Did shopping. 
20 TiiE COURT: Weil, I didn't make a finding that 
21 there was any bid snoppmg. All I concluded from it is 
22 that Mr. Lambert's clients had reason to be suspicious of 
23 wnat was going on, then when they didn't get any kind of an 
24 acceptance in a timely period of time, they had further 
25 reason to wonder what was going on. I don't find any 
1 communication frora your clients to his clients that, in so 
2 many words, says, you guys have got the contract, let's get 
3 ready to—the trusses going. A lot of little things and 
4 sot*\e of the people on the job kept—-they'd used the figure 
5 and kept thinking these people had it, but I think what's 
5 missing here is*—ie someiliing that comes out and says you 
7 guys have cot the contract, 
0 MR, IJ^B^rt?; I1::) going to—1*11 revise that, 
10 Tl-iE COURT: So, I don't know aocut this meeting 
^ | of the minds business. There just wasn't a contract here. 
1<5 . t\iX\ • - ; / "U v O^AJ . I U / \ r l y . 
13 , THE COURT; And the evidence, as far as I was 
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concerned, wasn't sufficient to convince ;ue to the contrary, 
and that basically says it all. . They had the burden of 
proving, and if I1:;* irdsccnstrued the law and ignored basic 
facts, then there's let of remedies that can be applied to 
that. 
I don't know about the Hui^ber Three, your 
conclusion there, any agreement was required to be in writing 
pursuant to that sect-ion or m e Coue* 
21E. rZTZZE; Is that Hurler Three in the— 
C „ r^„.., ~ .„.«, 4 ~ n """'~\,-~ ^  t "*T .o .-.> p "~ ^ *'• 'V'> * i" "' •">r,>'> Pi* ~ "r t"^ r^^V"-* ^V* ^  "t* 
c on elusion, 
concerned 
frauds? 
saying is 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
LAMBERT: 
COURT: 
LAMBERT: 
, that wasn't 
THE 
1 J 
to convince m 
COURT: 
ast didn1 
e that th 
and Quintek was bound. 
good idea 
MR. 
of 
LAMBERT: 
what I ne 
Okay 
But it 
That 
may be, may be true. 
was not a—as far 
a particular point, the 
No, I — 
t find 
-I think basically 
that the evidence 
as you were 
statute of 
what I'm 
was sufficient 
ere was a contract between the parties 
Okay I think I'm getting a pretty 
ed to do here. 
THE COURT: There was no acceptance endorsed on 
the—and I found no document showing acceptance and there's 
a couple of errors here in that ruling, it's typed in— 
written, there was no document showing acceptance within 
that period of time, that's referring to the ten days. And 
then I do comment that plaintiff could have—not could be, 
but could have easily net the conditions requested. That 
was—that's a conclusion that probably isn't necessary. 
It showed my—it shows ray frustration* 
MR. LAMZEET: That came through, your Honor, and 
.f ication. 
THE COURT: And what happened is they brought in 
their—who was it, the foreman on the job and all the rest 
of them, and kept testifying. The impression I got that 
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IN THE FOURTH. CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT 
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 883000004 
The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the 13th day 
of August, 1990, before the Hon. Robert J. Sumsion, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs president, 
Glen Hughes, was present and plaintiff was represented by its counsel, E. Nordell Weeks. 
Defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, was present and defendant was represented by its 
attorney, D. David Lambert. The Court received the evidence of the parties and has considered 
the arguments of counsel, together with the legal authorities presented, and now makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff corporation is a general contractor doing business within the 
State of Utah. 
2. The defendant is a Utah corporation in the business of manufacturing roof 
trusses and other building components which are supplied as finished products without doing 
work on the job site. 
3. In late October, 1983, the defendant became aware of the possibility of bidding 
on the Midland Elementary School to be constructed in Roy, Utah. This information came 
through the Intermountain Contractor bidding service, and an agent of the defendant corporation 
reviewed the materials available through the service. Defendant prepared an estimate of its cost 
to provide roof trusses for the school in question. 
4. On October 25, 1983, defendant communicated to plaintiff by telephone a bid 
proposal which had been reduced to writing and which was mailed to plaintiff the same day that 
the verbal communication took place. 
5. Plaintiff received the defendant's written bid proposal on October 27, 1983, 
as indicated by its date stamp placed thereon. Said document was received by the Court as 
Exhibit 6. 
6. Defendant's written bid proposal, (Exhibit 6) specified that the offer was to be 
accepted within ten days and provided a space at the bottom of the written document for 
plaintiff to sign in acceptance. 
7. Plaintiff never signed the bid proposal of the defendant and did not 
communicate with defendant until late November, 1983. 
2 
8. Larry Gilson, of Oscar E. Chytraus Co., prepared and submitted to plaintiff 
a bid for the trusses which are the subject of the plaintiffs claims. After the bid openings he 
was asked by plaintiff to meet and Mr. Gilson attended a meeting at the plaintiffs office. 
During that meeting Mr. Gilson was asked by plaintiff to reduce his bid proposal. After the 
meeting, Larry Gilson contacted defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, and advised Mr. 
Jacobson that in his opinion plaintiff was bid shopping the Quintek bid. 
9. The only written response of the plaintiff which directly addressed the terms 
of the bid proposal was made under cover letter dated November 21, 1983, and was in the form 
of a Supplier Agreement. The cover letter and Supplier Agreement were received by the Court 
as Exhibit 11. Exhibit 20, containing the notes of Don Brown, an employee of the defendant, 
gives reason to believe that Exhibit 11 was received by the defendant on or about November 
30, 1983. 
10. Defendant refused to sign the Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) and shortly after 
receiving the supplier agreement, defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, had discussions with 
Todd Walker, an employee of the plaintiff, stating his refusal to sign the Supplier Agreement. 
11. The Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) contains various terms which are different 
than the defendant's bid proposal (Exhibit 6), including the following terms: 
a. Specific terms concerning indemnification; 
b. Specific terms about assuming direct obligations to the owner; 
c. Language allowing the contractor to retain 10% of the purchase price 
until completion of the project; and 
d. Provisions concerning liquidated damages. 
3 
12. Certain shop drawings were done preliminary to defendant's submission of 
the bid proposal to the plaintiff. It is unclear if those same drawings were later submitted to 
plaintiff, but a drawing (Exhibit 13) was sent and discussions occurred relative to possible 
performance by defendant in fabricating the trusses in question. 
13. Defendant never began fabrication of the trusses and never produced any of 
the trusses for the school in question. 
The Court having made the above Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff failed to carry its burden to establish that there was an agreement 
between the parties. 
2. Plaintiffs Supplier Agreement was belated and untimely and did not create a 
contract. 
3. Plaintiffs conduct concerning the Oscar Chytraus bid was communicated to 
the defendant and made the defendant justifiably suspicious about the plaintiffs intentions. This 
fact, coupled with the failure of the plaintiff to act in a timely manner to confirm an agreement 
convinced the court that an agreement between the parties was never concluded. 
4. Defendant acted promptly and reasonably to notify the plaintiff that it rejected 
the terms proposed in the supplier agreement. 
5. No partial performance occurred in that no aspect of the final product to be 
supplied was ever fabricated, no step of fabrication, except a preliminary drawing, was ever 
commenced, plaintiff never accepted or received any goods and plaintiff paid no monies to 
defendant. 
4 
6. The supplier agreement sent to defendant by the plaintiff, in addition to being 
untimely, was materially different than defendant's original proposal. 
7. Defendant's efforts to pursue an agreement with the plaintiff after its offer 
expired does not constitute a waiver or otherwise convince the court that an agreement was ever 
reached. 
8. Plaintiff alleged only a cause of action for breach of contract and no estoppel 
or reliance claims were pleaded or proven. 
9. Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed with prejudice-with costs to defendant. 
DATED this O day of December, 1990. - v v 
BY THE COURT: - N >>. 
- m 
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